CONSTITUTIONAL REPAIR IN HUNGARY
Launched on 13 April 2026, this Infohub provides resources and information concerning the task of repairing Hungary’s democracy and constitutional system after 16 years of anti-democratic rule under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.
A "political earthquake". Hungary's parliamentary elections on Sunday 12 April 2026 — with a record 77.8% turnout — ousted Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party after 16 years in power, during which Hungary became a paradigm case of democratic backsliding through manipulation of the law ('autocratic legalism'). Not since 1989 has the country faced such a profound moment of transition, which pro-democratic forces hope will restore the country's democratic trajectory. This challenge of 'Constitutional Repair' is one of our five focus areas at Demoptimism.
Repairing institutions is crucial, and raises difficult rule-of-law questions. Repairing democratic culture, and achieving depolarisation, is an even harder task. Deciding on the accountability of the ancien régime is yet another thorny issue. None of this will be easy, exacerbated by question marks hovering over opposition leader Péter Magyar's commitment to reform as a former Fidesz loyalist. Much can be learned not only from nearby Poland, but also from other states that have experienced recent anti-democratic governments, such as Brazil and the USA. We will continue to develop this InfoHub as we gather more material on this evolving challenge.
Page Editor:
Prof. Tomás Daly, Director, Demoptimism
EXPLAINERS
Short Reads
Wojciech SADURSKI, ‘Warsaw in Budapest: Four Lessons from Poland for Magyar’ Gazeta Wyborcza (13 April 2026)
László BRUZST, ‘Why Orbán Lost’ Project Syndicate (13 April 2026)
Bálint MIKOLA, ‘Watershed Elections in Hungary: What’s at Stake?’ Review of Democracy (10 April 2026)
RM WESTERINK, ‘Hungary’s Democratic Restoration: A Blueprint for Europe and Hungary After Orbán’ Europe is Us Blogspot (13 April 2026)
Zsofia BOCSKAY, ‘Hungary election: how a new opponent has forced Viktor Orbán into the first genuinely competitive race in 16 years’ The Conversation (10 April 2026)
Long Reads
Veronica ANGHEL & Erik JONES, ‘What Went Wrong in Hungary’ (2024) 35(2) Journal of Democracy 52
Kim SCHEPPELE, ‘Autocratic Legalism’ (2018) 85 University of Chicago Law Review 545
“The rule of law is in ashes, and whether it can be resurrected, whether it can rise like a phoenix from the ashes is a question we are receiving a lot. There are quite a lot of things that are missing [from Magyar’s platform]. Some Hungarians would like him to talk a lot more in this context about fundamental rights, or pluralism, as a key pillar of democracy...”
WATCH: REBUILDING THE RULE OF LAW IN HUNGARY
On 30 March the Central European University (CEU) convened a discussion featuring Prof. Petra Bárd (Radboud University Nijmegen;ELTE), Prof. Christophe Hillion (University of Oslo), and Márta Pardavi (Co-Chair, Helsinki Foundation) on the role of the EU law and EU institutions in rebuilding rule of law principles, such as judicial independence and separation of powers. This is part of an event series titled ‘Confronting Goliath: Hungarian Authoritarian Elections in a Comparative Perspective’ (coordinated by Bálint Mikola), which aims to provide theoretical and comparative reflections on the prospects of democratic restoration in Hungary.
““Independently of the size of his governing majority [Magyar] cannot adopt the same autocratic practices Fidesz chose to follow in the past 16 years if he is to keep his most important electoral promise: the re-democratization of Hungary.”
READ
The Tisza party’s two-thirds supermajority brings the power to fully re-shape the constitutional order in ways that have been impossible in nearby Poland. However, does it also raise dangers that require close attention? In this blog post Zoltán Ádám (Senior Research Fellow, ELTE Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest) addresses the threat of potentially unilateral governance.
Zoltán ÁDÁM, ‘Beating (Authoritarian) Populism with (Democratic) Populism: Orbán’s Anticipated Defeat and the Danger of Unlimited Single Party-Rule’ Verfassungsblog (9 April 2026)
“Are there circumstances when, during this restoration, the principles of the rule of law are allowed to be violated? (...) [D]eviations from the principle that the rule of law cannot be restored by violating its principles must be exceptional, temporary and proportionally tailored.”
READ: ANALYSIS OF KEY CHALLENGES
The following are pieces from a debate symposium on ‘Restoring Constitutionalism’ published on Verfassungsblog (2 July 2021 – 18 March 2022). The list below focuses on the most Hungary-specific pieces, but a range of additional posts address additional states (e.g. Romania, Turkey, USA) and take more general theoretical perspectives. Crucially, this debate unfolded at a time — before the 2022 parliamentary elections — when it was assumed that the opposition could not win the two-third parliamentary majority to change the Constitution.
Andrew ARATO & Gábor HALMAI, ‘So that the Name Hungarian Regain its Dignity: Strategy for the Making of a New Constitution’ (2 July 2021)
Andrew ARATO & András SAJÓ, ‘Restoring Constitutionalism: An Open Letter’ (21 November 2021)
András SAJÓ, ‘La légalité nous tue’ (9 December 2021)
András JAKAB, ‘How to Return from a Hybrid Regime to Constitutionalism in Hungary’ (11 December 2021)
Gábor HALMAI, ‘Restoring Constitutionalism in Hungary’ (13 December 2021)
Renáta UITZ, ‘On Constitutional Transition out of Hybrid Regimes’ (15 December 2021)
Csaba GYŐRY, ‘Governance or Revolution?’ (16 December 2021)
András L. PAP, ‘Four Recommendations for Constitutional Restoration in Hungary’ (19 December 2021)
Johanna FRÖHLICH, ‘Do We Want a Constitution?’ (20 December 2021)
Kim Lane SCHEPPELE, ‘Escaping Orbán’s Constitutional Prison’ (21 December 2021)
Beata BAKÓ, ‘Why Throw a Constitution out of the Window Instead of Making it Work?’ (23 December 2021)
Michael MEYER-RESENDE, ‘Removing the Cement from Hungary´s Constitutional Edifice’ (24 December 2021)
Kriszta KOVÁCS, ‘Universalism and Particularism in Constitutional Drafting’ (24 February 2022)
Armin VON BOGDANDY & Luke Dimitrios SPIEKER, ‘How to Set Aside Hungarian Cardinal Laws’(18 March 2022)
“To be able to counter illiberal chicanery, efforts of constitutional (re-)settlement should embrace the force of constitutional imagination informing constitutional design.”
7 questions
In their contribution to the symposium above, Andrew Arato and Gábor Halmai posed 7 questions that are of particular relevance to the Hungarian context - although, crucially, they were posed at a time — before the 2022 parliamentary elections — when it was assumed that the opposition could not win the two-third parliamentary majority to change the Constitution. Again, this was at a time — before the 2022 parliamentary elections — when it was assumed that the opposition could not win the two-third parliamentary majority to change the Constitution. However, many of these questions remain extremely important.
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If a constitution is demonstrably incompatible, in part and even as a whole, or simply in view of its social and political consequences, with the principles of the rule of law, should it be rapidly replaced or radically amended? How to determine such incompatibility?
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Round tables, where political parties convened in an informal setting were often used in transitions to democracy. Is such negotiated process adequate and defensible from the perspective of constitutional and democratic theory?
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Many democratic constitutions all over the world were created under procedures that did not correspond to the formal amendment requirements in place. Is such disrespect of formal rule-making (constitution-making) appropriate in the absence of a collapse of the state or a revolution, if the previous regime is corrupt and based its existence on a violation of the rule of law? What should be the procedural and substantive minimum in case such process is considered legitimate even if illegal?
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Given that popular sovereignty and the constituent power of the people are recognized as primary concerns in democratic constitutional theory, what kind of popular participation would legitimize extra-constitutional constitution-making? Is approval in referenda of a constitutional project a necessity in such a case? Is the optimal realization of principles of popular sovereignty in the process of constitution-making a remedy to the violation of previous formal rules of amendment or replacement?
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Do you agree or disagree that a generally accepted component of a democratically legitimate form of constitution-making is a freely elected drafting assembly, constituent assembly or convention or even a regular parliament designated for that purpose as long as elected according to a fair and inclusive electoral system, even of these forms are not called upon constitution-making by the constitution in force? What are the reasons for one or another solution? What local considerations are to be taken into account? How to enable public discussion and participation?
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What are the substantive requirements applicable to the legal system during the process of constitution-making? Is the old constitution to be applied in this interim period? In its totality or at least in terms of fundamental rights (assuming that these are protected in the constitution in force)? If so, how to guarantee such protection (for example by relying on existing institutions like courts)?
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What to do (in light of constitutional theory) if a consensual process of constitution making relying on all important actors turns out to be impossible?
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
The following are a selection of pieces that expressly compare the Hungarian context to experiences in other states, helping to draw out both the distinctiveness of the constitutional repair challenge in Hungary as well as its commonalities with those elsewhere.
Gábor HALMAI, ‘Two Non-Constitutional Non-Democracies’ Verfassungsblog (16 January 2026)
Tom Gerald DALY, ‘Constitutional Repair: A Comparative Theory’ Demoptimism Working Paper Series No. 2-2023 (December 2023).
MORE TO COME
We intend to add more to this page in due course, especially key research and policy publications for those seeking fuller analysis of this crisis, its context, and how lessons from the experiences of other states can help.