‘Warsaw in Budapest: Four Lessons from Poland for Magyar’

Wojciech SADURSKI

Gazeta Wyborcza (13 April 2026)

Note: This is the AI-generated English translation (provided by the author with permission) of a media article that appeared in the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza on 13 April 2026. The original article can be found here.

__________

It was supposed to be “Budapest in Warsaw,” at least in the dreams of the PiS chairman, but it has turned out instead that we may see “Warsaw in Budapest.” Hungary has now joined the short list of countries where authoritarian populists have been sent to the opposition benches by the electorate. Perhaps Péter Magyar can learn a few things from Polish democrats—both positively (what to do) and negatively (what to avoid).

All this must, however, be preceded by an obvious caveat: no matter how close the “brother nations” may feel to one another, Hungary is not Poland. Paradoxically, TISZA will have both an easier and a harder task than the 15 October 2023 Coalition in Poland. It will have an easier one because, first, it will not have to work in the shadow of an obstructionist president (the Hungarian president has minimal powers and, in particular, cannot veto legislation, though he or she may refer it to the Constitutional Court, itself subordinated to Orbán). Second, much suggests that Fidesz activists are more cynical than the highly ideologized PiS elite, and thus easier to draw over to Magyar’s side—Magyar being, after all, “bone of Fidesz’s bone.” As the well‑known constitutional scholar András Jakab wrote, it will be easier in Hungary for Orbán’s people to find a modus vivendi with the new authorities. Third, the procedure for constitutional amendment in Hungary is much simpler and faster, so just as Orbán managed to adopt the Fundamental Law at express speed in 2011, Magyar will be able to introduce constitutional amendments—or even an entirely new constitution—to support the changes. Finally, fourth, the Hungarian government will be a single‑party government, and we in Poland know all too well what coalition politics means for democratic and liberty‑oriented reforms.

But in several respects Magyar will face a more difficult task. First, because the scale of systemic destruction in Hungary is much broader and deeper than in Poland under PiS: beyond the judiciary, civil service, and so on, it encompasses spheres that in Poland remained relatively uninfected by authoritarianism, such as universities, private media, and NGOs. Second, Hungarian systemic corruption is incomparable to that of PiS (which was not small): Hungarian oligarchs are creations of political power and thus its vassals, unlike in Poland, where the wealthiest often made their fortunes despite, not thanks to, the government. Péter Magyar therefore inherits a genuine “mafia state,” to use the famous term (and book title) of Bálint Magyar (no relation). Finally, the erosion of democracy in Poland occurred largely through breaking the law, whereas in Hungary it occurred through changing the law (including the Constitution). Undoing toxic changes will therefore be harder there, because it will not be enough to “simply” stop breaking the law and bring the culprits before a court. It will be necessary to demonstrate that the law itself was unlawful.

That said, Hungary now finds itself in a very similar historical moment, and can learn a few things from us. Here, offhand, are four lessons worth studying carefully in Budapest.

First—the chief task of the Hungarian authorities in 2026, just as in Poland from early 2024, is to defuse the institutional “land mines” planted by their predecessors in the form of irremovable officials or unchangeable procedures. Just as in Poland it was necessary—laboriously, and still not fully successfully—to devise ways of dealing with the Constitutional Tribunal, the new chambers of the Supreme Court, the leadership of the prosecutor’s office, or the neo‑NCJ [National Council of Judiciary], so in Hungary Orbán entrenched, through constitutional means, a “deep state,” that is, enclaves of the Fidesz system. TISZA’s having constitutional majority helps, but does not provide a full solution, because, for example, the president of the National Judicial Council (the Hungarian equivalent of the NCJ) or the President of the new Supreme Court (called the Kúria) can be removed by a two‑thirds majority, but only for strictly defined reasons, and a future constitutional termination of their terms will not apply to current officeholders unless the new constitutional amendment explicitly states so. And that will scandalize some constitutionalists, who will argue that a constitution is not meant for dismissing specific officials.

Second, a major lesson from the Polish case of restoring democracy and the rule of law is that the pace and sequence of changes are just as important—and sometimes even more important—than the substance of those changes. Pace: because sluggishness breeds fatigue and impatience in public opinion, and as Machiavelli already taught, the Prince should undertake unpopular actions as early as possible in his rule, so that over time people will forgive and forget. Sequence: because not everything can be done at once, the scale of needed changes is enormous, and this ship must be repaired on the open sea—meaning that normal state functions must be carried out in parallel with reforms. The sequence of changes must be rational and logical; priorities must be chosen and explained patiently and sensibly to society.

Which brings me to the third lesson: the durability of public support for the new authorities should not be taken at face value, because it is a commodity that wears out quickly. In Poland, the great support for the 15 October 2023 Coalition eroded rapidly in 2026. Real mistakes by the new government, greed for positions, shifts in the global political climate, irrational nostalgia for the identitarian ideology of the former authorities, or something else entirely—all contributed to the shakiness of public support. Sympathy is fickle. Magyar’s advisers will have more than enough useful material from which to draw practical conclusions.

And the fourth lesson, perhaps the most important. The process of accountability and reform will be accompanied by admonitions—from within the democratic camp—that restoring the rule of law cannot be done by violating the rule of law, and that radical reforms will only increase polarization. One must be prepared for these well‑meaning and sincerely motivated complaints, and not give in to them too much. For the demand of absolute compliance with all domestic legal provisions, including those entrenching the “deep state,” and in a situation where the independent constitutional court is non‑functional, is a recipe for reform paralysis. And calls for reconciliation, unity, and “depolarization” before a real consolidation of democratic institutions has taken place only entrench a bad status quo in which each political tribe will have its own courts, prosecutors, Constitutional Tribunals – and its own state.

We know one or two things about it from Poland.