The short answer is yes. All major democracy indices concur that democratic regression is an intensifying global problem (e.g. Freedom House, V-Dem, International IDEA).

The world has experienced multiple ‘waves’ of democratisation, which have each time been followed by a ‘reverse wave’ that rolls back democratic progress in many states.

The third wave of democratisation from the 1970s to the late 1990s introduced or strengthened democracy globally, with democratic transitions from military, one-party, and Communist rule, as well as Apartheid, in every world region (e.g. Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Hungary, Poland, Indonesia, South Korea, South Africa, Botswana).

That momentum has now reversed, with populist, illiberal, and even antidemocratic political leaders and forces winning increasing support and entering into government, especially since 2010 (just think of Viktor Orbán in Hungary, the Law and Justice Party in Poland, Donald Trump and Bolsonaro in the Americas, and Nigel Farage’s Reform Party in the UK).

The precise causes differ from state to state, and it is important to make distinctions between the ‘democratic starting point’ of a given state: some affected states are established democracies (e.g. Germany, India, USA), others are younger democracies (e.g. Brazil, Poland). In some states, what we are seeing is a troubled, stalled or reversed democratisation process (e.g. Turkey, Philippines).

Key theories include the following:

cultural backlash: Scholars like Pippa Norris and Ron Inglehart offer that what we are seeing is a backlash against a decades-long cultural shift regarding gender roles, immigration, greater diversity, and secularisation, with authoritarian populist leaders fostering a ‘politics of resentment’ to grow their support or even win government.

economic insecurity: some scholars, such as David Autor, offer that the main root cause is ‘losers of globalisation’, while others point to the economic insecurity caused by the spread of neoliberalism (including the economic ‘shock therapy’ in post-Communist states). However, others such as Tom Carothers and Brendan Hartnett have recently questioned the centrality of economic factors.

authoritarian nostalgia: In world regions such as Asia, there is increasing head-scratching about common public nostalgia for previous dictatorships (e.g. Indonesia, Philippines).

This is a difficult question and depends on what dimension of crisis we are looking at:

Decay: Longstanding dynamics that are undercutting democratic governance and viable democratic communities are now very prevalent in older democracies, such as declining voting rates, interest in politics, and trust in politicians and institutions.

Backsliding: The phenomenon of government-led undermining of democracy has been called the ‘third wave of autocratization’. In 2019 Anna Lührmann and Staffan Lindberg produced the first comprehensive empirical overview of all autocratization episodes from 1900 to today based on data from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem), concluding that the perception of a negative trend is backed by the evidence.

Rupture: In the 2000s and 2010s it was slowly accepted that democratic backsliding had replaced coups d'état as the dominant threat to democracy worldwide. However, we may now be seeing an increase in a form of ‘self-coup’ that proceeds from backsliding processes and resembles traditional coups in key respects. The attempts to overturn presidential election results through Capitol riots in the USA and Brazil, President Yoon’s martial law declaration in South Korea, and the second Trump presidency all raise these questions. However, this remains a marginal phenomenon.

The podcasts, readings and links below discuss a range of examples, but current examples include:

• Democratic decay: In states such as Germany, France, Sweden, and the UK, populist authoritarian and illiberal parties have grown very significantly in recent years. In other states, such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, polarisation is re-shaping politics and views once viewed as extreme (e.g. policies to reduce the rights of minorities) have become more mainstream. We also see governments increasingly willing to curb protest and avoid accountability in their operations (e.g. by reducing freedom of information frameworks).

• Democratic backsliding: Hungary, Poland and the USA have become paradigmatic examples where democratically-elected governments, once in power, act to disable or capture the courts, suppress the political opposition, and entrench themselves in power by manipulating the electoral system.

• Democratic rupture: acute threats that abruptly end, or threaten to end, democratic rule - including attempted self-coups in the USA, Brazil and South Korea as well as military coups d'état

This is a common question. In simple terms, it is rooted in a very thin conception of democracy that equates democracy to elections. On this view, whoever wins the elections in given state should have a free hand to govern as they see fit.

However, although it is a fundamentally contested concept, for most scholars and policymakers worldwide, democracy is conceived of as involving more than elections.

An increasingly common view in comparative constitutional studies is that the baseline for a ‘true’ democracy worthy of the name encompasses not only popular control through elections but also a commitment to liberal tenets such as respect for individual autonomy, judicial independence, minority rights, and constraints on government power (often discussed under the rubrics of constitutionalism or the rule of law). Key concepts here are ‘liberal constitutional democracy’, ‘self-sustaining democracy’, and the ‘democratic minimum core’.

This overlaps substantially with political science conceptions, although these tend to more fully delineate the ‘democratic’ and ‘liberal’ dimensions of genuinely democratic rule: for instance, Philippe Schmitter’s conception of “real-existing” democracy identifies democratic principles (freedom to act collectively, equality for the exercise of citizenship, participation in decision-making, accountability of rulers, and public decision-making by majority vote or acclamation) and liberal principles (freedom from tyrannical rulers, competition between political representatives, rights for the protection of private property, checks and balances between governing institutions, and the rule of law and supremacy of constitutional courts).

Governments are not the only state actors undermining democratic systems worldwide.

In the USA, India, Brazil and Indonesia, for instance, many view the top court as complicit or at least as feeding negative patterns through corruption, inaction, or self-dealing.

In some states, the increasing political role of the military is a key concern (e.g. Brazil, Indonesia, and the USA).

More broadly, Big Tech and social media giants are commonly viewed as undermining democratic functioning.

As discussed in the section above (‘What is causing this crisis?’), democratic crisis has many drivers. In all states the regression of democratic norms and attitudes, and the accompanying rise of anti-democratic political actors, involves a complex relationship between ‘supply’ and ‘demand’.

Authoritarian populist and illiberal politicians and parties are gaining more support partly because they are able to create new constituencies that don’t always cut across established left-right and party-system divides. They are ‘political entrepreneurs’, creating a market for ideas that have for decades been viewed as extremist.

By turn, complex media dynamics come into play. This includes outmoded attachment to ‘balanced’ reporting, which focuses on presenting all political opinions as equally valid, that conceives of objectivity as viewpoint neutrality, and that tends to reduce complex questions of governance and constitutionalism into political horse races and inter-personal disputes.

The decline in the traditional media business model has also undermined public interest journalism, while the rise of new media and social media has blurred the line between fact and opinion, and removed the rigour, professional norms, and oversight that used to discipline reporting on political matters.

Far from it! Although trends of democratic decay continue to intensify, we see many examples of Resisting Threats and counter-trends of democratic innovation and reinvention have also been gathering momentum - see the sections on Renewing Participation and Redesigning Democracy here.

In addition, while the COVID-19 pandemic generated serious challenges for democracies worldwide, the worst hit political systems were severely backsliding, hybrid and authoritarian regimes. Many democracies exhibited resilience, creativity and innovation in response to the pandemic. See more on this in the Highlights section below.